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Corruption and Cooperative Organizations  
Cooperatives, like other forms of business firms, 
operate within the prevailing economic environ-
ment. Corruption — which involves “… some 
aspect of transaction for personal gain, ignoring 
of community trust, misuse of authority and re-
sponsibility to the social system, and/or sacrifice 
of group for private gain” (Hamer, 1981, p. 202) 
— is an important part of this environment.  
Although the literature is limited, there is evi-
dence that corruption in cooperatives and inves-
tor-owned firms (IOF) is widespread in develop-
ing and transition economies where corruption 
generally is common. Cooperative corruption is 
also found closer to home. Two recent examples 
from the United States include the Ashby Farm-
ers’ Cooperative Elevator in Minnesota where the 
general manager stole from the cooperative and 
the Tri-County Electric Cooperative in South 
Carolina where board members enriched them-
selves with perks and benefits. In Canada, the 
PACE Credit Union was placed under the regula-
tor’s control in 2018 after two senior executives 
were discovered to have received secret loans and 
payments from the credit union.  
Despite its prevalence, corruption has been large-
ly ignored in the economic literature. The result is 
that little is known about its impact on the output 
and prices generated by firms and the benefits 
that firms create for society. Since a common rai-
son d’etre for cooperatives is their ability to pro-
vide better returns for their members, corrupt 
behavior in these  organizations  could  jeopardize 




Livestock and Products, 
Weekly Average       
Nebraska Slaughter Steers, 
35-65% Choice, Live Weight. . . . . .  . 110.00 * * 
Nebraska Feeder Steers, 
Med. & Large Frame, 550-600 lb. . . . . 159.39 162.21 161.11 
Nebraska Feeder Steers, 
Med. & Large Frame 750-800 lb. . .. . 152.82 150.60 149.66 
Choice Boxed Beef, 
600-750 lb. Carcass. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214.12 222.12 216.04 
Western Corn Belt Base Hog Price 
Carcass, Negotiated . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. * * * 
Pork Carcass Cutout, 185 lb. Carcass 
51-52% Lean. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76.74 79.83 93.27 
Slaughter Lambs, wooled and shorn, 
135-165 lb. National. . . . . . . 141.10 136.31 162.88 
National Carcass Lamb Cutout 
FOB. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 396.39 424.93 437.30 
Crops, 
Daily Spot Prices       
Wheat, No. 1, H.W. 
Southwest NE, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.68 NA 4.84 
Corn, No. 2, Yellow 
Central NE, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . 3.83 NA 3.67 
Soybeans, No. 1, Yellow 
Central NE, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . 8.41 NA 10.00 
Grain Sorghum, No.2, Yellow 
Southeast NE, cwt. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.13 NA 4.55 
Oats, No. 2, Heavy 
Minneapolis, Mn, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.21 NA 2.96 
Feed       
Alfalfa, Large Square Bales, 
Good to Premium, RFV 160-185 
Northeast Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . . * 155.00 155.00 
Alfalfa, Large Rounds, Good 
Platte Valley, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107.50 * * 
Grass Hay, Large Rounds, Good 
 Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Dried Distillers Grains, 10% Moisture 
Nebraska Average. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147.00 151.00 165.00 
Wet Distillers Grains, 65-70% Moisture 
Nebraska Average. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50.00 44.08 49.58 
 ⃰  No Market       
the achievement of this objective. In particular, one of 
the recurring themes in the economic literature on 
agricultural cooperatives is that they are pro-
competitive — i.e., because of their ownership struc-
ture, they are assumed to operate at cost, thus forcing 
monopsonistic or oligopsonistic processing firms to 
increase prices and, at least partially, offset the market 
power these firms exert.  
This result, however, typically rests on the assumption 
that cooperatives and IOFs share a common cost and 
revenue structure. If cooperatives face higher costs or 
lower revenues than IOFs because of greater manage-
rial corruption, the pro-competitive effect could be 
jeopardized. It is expected that cooperative managers 
might engage in more corruption because it is be-
lieved that managerial corruption is positively linked 
to economic activity; the intuition is that greater ac-
tivity offers more incentive for corrupt activities such 
as bribes. Since cooperatives are generally expected to 
produce more output than their investor-owned 
counterparts, the question that arises is whether the 
competition effect could be offset by the corruption 
effect. 
A key objective of a research paper we published in 
the latest issue of the Canadian Journal of Agricultural 
Economics was to determine if the presence of corrup-
tion in cooperative organizations can jeopardize their 
pro-competitive impact.  
Our results reveal that, although it is welfare reducing, 
corruption does not reverse/outweigh the competitive 
effect of cooperatives. Importantly, this result holds 
regardless of the functional form of the production 
function or of the farm input supply curve, and re-
gardless of whether the organization (cooperative or 
IOF) is a price taker or has market power in the 
downstream market for the product. In short, the pro-
competitive effect dominates under almost all market 
conditions. 
While the results presented in this paper provide sup-
port for the pro-competitive effect of cooperatives, 
they also suggest that this effect can be expected to be 
greater when it is costly to engage in corruption. 
However, when the cost of corruption is low, the like-
lihood is greater of a convergence in the corruption 
level chosen by cooperatives and IOFs, and in a con-
vergence of their performance (prices paid, benefits 
created). In such situations, it is expected that cooper-
atives  are  less able to  provide  a  competitive  benefit  
and would be more difficult to introduce and/or 
maintain.  
One of the key factors determining corruption 
costs is the economic environment in which firms 
operate. Although cooperatives are found in coun-
tries with widely different corruption levels, the 
vast majority of the 300 largest cooperatives in the 
world are found in Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) countries 
where corruption is relatively low. This concentra-
tion is consistent with our finding that cooperatives 
enjoy an advantage in environments where corrup-
tion is costly. However, other factors, some of them 
firm-specific — such as the nature of the govern-
ance structure — can also be at work. Indeed, fur-
ther research is required to understand the reasons 
for the corruption found in U.S. and Canadian co-
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